Shaping Competition Policy in the Americas:  Scope for Transatlantic Cooperation? by Singham, Shanker A.
Brooklyn Journal of International Law
Volume 24 | Issue 2 Article 2
1-1-1998
Shaping Competition Policy in the Americas:
Scope for Transatlantic Cooperation?
Shanker A. Singham
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Journal of
International Law by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Shanker A. Singham, Shaping Competition Policy in the Americas: Scope for Transatlantic Cooperation?, 24 Brook. J. Int'l L. 363 (1998).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil/vol24/iss2/2
SYMPOSIUM ARTICLES
SHAPING COMPETITION POLICY
IN THE AMERICAS: SCOPE FOR
TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION?
Shanker A. Singham*
I. INTRODUCTION
As more and more countries embrace a free market econo-
my and start to adopt and enforce laws that regulate those
markets, it is becoming increasingly relevant to ask how those
laws are to be implemented and enforced. For example, all of
the countries in Central and Eastern Europe adopted the pro-
visions of European competition law encapsulated in Articles
85 and 86 of the Treaty Establishing the European Communi-
ty.' Largely this was done in order to assist them in their bids
to join the European Union itself. In Latin America, some
countries have adopted European-style concepts in their anti-
trust laws (for example Venezuela), and others (like Brazil or
Mexico) have adopted laws that more closely resemble the
Sherman Act of the United States.2 It is not at all clear, how-
ever, that the wholesale adoption by emerging economies of the
provisions of one or another of these two systems would be in
the interests of the countries, short-term or long-term.3 Cer-
* Shanker A. Singham is an American lawyer and English solicitor practic-
ing with Steel Hector & Davis, LLP in Miami, Florida.
1. Treaty Establishing the European Community, arts. 85-86, Feb. 7, 1992,
[1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573, 626 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by
Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 224) (1992), [19921 1 C.M.L.R.
719, 31 I.L.M. 247 [hereinafter TEU]. The TEU amended the Treaty Establishing
the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Br.
Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-II [hereinafter EEC Treaty], as amended by Single
European Act, O.J. (L 169) (1987), [19871 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA].
2. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1994).
3. See Spencer Weber Waller, Neo-Realism and the International Harmoniza-
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tainly, careful analysis must be conducted in assessing which
antitrust policy must be used to inform the enforcement deci-
sions of the individual country's antitrust authorities.
This paper will consider similarities and differences be-
tween European competition law and U.S. antitrust law on the
one hand, and attempt to draw some conclusions about the
different factors which underlie antitrust or competition policy
on the other. It will focus on those areas of difference between
EU and U.S. systems, and how policy differences may be used
to aid the implementation and enforcement of antitrust laws in
Latin America. It will also highlight examples of countries that
have long had antitrust laws, but are only now beginning to
enforce them. Also, it will analyze how they are being enforced,
and what can be done to enable antitrust laws to be enforced
in a manner that is ultimately beneficial to the particular
country concerned and sufficiently predictable and certain for
the business community.
The paper will survey the current competition regimes in
some countries in Latin America and seek to identify those
areas where a hybrid policy, drawing on concepts of European
and U.S. antitrust law and policy, might be more appropriate,
given the countries' own domestic economic priorities. Focusing
on specific markets, the paper will also survey and propose
how an antitrust policy suitable for emerging economies might
be developed, and, to the extent possible, develop core concepts
which might be used to inform such antitrust policies.
The economic liberalization in Latin America has meant
that there is increasing evidence of more reliance on antitrust
enforcement in Latin America. The liberalization of Latin
American economies may lead to a firmer view of such
anticompetitive practices as price fixing and division of mar-
kets. There will be a number of areas where highly concentrat-
ed markets remain, and it is important for these to be properly
regulated. The growth in international joint ventures will lead
to a greater emphasis on governmental supervision of mergers
and acquisitions. In addition, it is important that antitrust
enforcement not stifle the flow of foreign investment into the
countries of the region. Consideration of what actually consti-
tutes the market will become relevant. It will become increas-
tion of Law: Lessons from Antitrust, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 557, 564-65, 582 (1994).
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ingly important to consider the global, or at least sub-regional
welfare effects in performing market analysis. The countries of
Central and South America are considering which competition
system to favor, the European or the U.S. system, both in its
implementation, and in its philosophical basis. An opportunity
lies for the transatlantic relationship to be used to lock in
substantial reforms in the economies of the Latin American
countries, and to put in place competition regimes that make
sense for their own internal economic growth and social poli-
cies.
II. PimosoPIcAL BAsIS FOR ANTITRUST
A. Introduction
In order to understand the basis of competition law, it is
instructive to look at the U.S. and European systems by com-
paring and contrasting their underlying goals.
Since the U.S. system is largely predicated on minimizing
welfare losses to consumers, it is deemed to be most important
to prevent anticompetitive practices such as price fixing and
cartelization. The Sherman Act states, in pertinent part:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several [sitates, or with foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal ....
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize,
or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty
of a felony....'
The Clayton Act5 gives private rights of action to individuals
who are adversely affected by behavior which is prohibited by
the antitrust legislation.6
EU competition law is governed by Articles 85 and 86 of
4. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1994).
5. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994).
6. See id. § 18(i)(1).
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the Treaty Establishing the European Community.' Article
85(1) states that:
The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the
common market: all agreements between undertakings, deci-
sions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices
which may affect trade between Member States and which
have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or
distortion of competition within the common market, and in
particular those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or
any other trading conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical devel-
opment, or investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions
with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a
competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to accep-
tance by the other parties of supplementary obligations
which, by their nature or according to commercial usage,
have no connection with the subject of such contracts.'
Article 85(2) states that such agreements shall be auto-
matically void. Article 85(3) allows exceptions in certain cases,
either by specific application to the European Commission, or
by a system of negative clearance designed to facilitate busi-
ness transactions.
Article 86 provides that:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant posi-
tion within the common market or in a substantial part of it
shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market
insofar as it may affect trade between Member States.
7. See EC Treaty, supra note 1.
8. Id. art. 85(1).
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Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or
selling prices or other unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical develop-
ment to the prejudice of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transac-
tions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at
a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to accep-
tance by the other parties of supplementary obligations
which, by their nature or according to commercial usage,
have no connection with the subject of such contracts?
These two articles have direct effect, and therefore may be
relied on by any private individual in his national court. How-
ever, this ability has not been fully exploited, and national
courts have shown a marked reluctance to involve themselves
in actions based on Article 85, which has primarily been relied
on as a defensive weapon, at least in UK courts.
There are a number of substantive and procedural differ-
ences that are regularly exposed in the analysis of the differing
decisions on the increasing number of transatlantic mergers.
This will be analyzed in detail later, but some preliminary
points are worth noting now. Analysis of the case law and the
manner in which the Sherman Act and Articles 85 and 86 have
been interpreted illustrate that U.S. law now precludes any
attempt to gain a monopoly position. European law does not.
European law merely precludes the abuse of that position once
attained. While the Europeans do not view a monopoly as
anything inherently bad per se, the United States appears to
view the attempt to become a monopolist as behavior which
should be penalized because it is thought that monopolists
always behave with monopoly power and seek to extract mo-
nopoly rents from consumers.
Early U.S. cases suggest that the purpose of the Clayton
9. Id. art. 86.
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Act (the U.S. anti-merger law) was to punish monopolies in
their incipiency, especially where there was a history of con-
centration. ° The apotheosis of this trend was reached in
United States v. Von's Grocery, which clearly articulated the
role of merger law to build up the small business sector."
Many decisions were heavily motivated by the desire to protect
smaller firms from the actions of their larger rivals. With the
ascendancy of the Chicago School economists, this trend was
reversed and the U.S. position now would be not to look on mo-
nopolies as something inherently bad, but to assess the
merger's effect on competition in the market and its effect on
price to consumers. When reviewing U.S. case law, it is very
important to know which economic school was in the ascendan-
cy when the decision was handed down.
The Europeans are more concerned with the actual
anticompetitive conduct of firms with a dominant position in
the market. The reason for this difference is historical. One of
the main reasons for the formation of the European Union was
to create a market large enough to compete against their U.S.
rivals. In addition, European competition law was formulated
to ensure that the barriers to trade within Europe, which had
been eliminated by the formation of the European Community
itself, could not be erected by businesses cartelizing the region.
Hence, market integration is a very important goal of Europe-
an competition law. There was also a concern that as larger
operations began to be formed, small business would lose out,
and this concern was addressed by laws that were more de-
signed to level the playing field than to address the specific
interests of consumers.
So what should the philosophical basis for a competition
policy for the Latin American region be as we go forward into
the twenty first century and advance towards closer hemi-
spheric integration? What should be the guiding star for such a
policy-should it be the allocative-efficiency model of which the
primary proponent is the Chicago School? Or should a hemi-
spheric competition policy be guided by some other light, par-
ticularly in the developing and semi-industrialized economies
of Latin America?
10. See, e.g., United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 461 (1964);
Brown Shoe v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 317, 346 (1962).
11. United States v. Von's Grocery, 384 U.S. 270, 276-77 (1966).
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B. The Allocative Efficiency Model
In order to assess what sort of market model should be
striven for in the hemispheric region, it will behoove us to
consider the different models in greater detail. Economically,
any market externality will adversely affect the operation of an
entirely free market. This view was best articulated by the
Chicago School economists who sought to apply the antitrust
laws in such a way as to preserve this free market. The eco-
nomic model, favored by the Chicago School, relies entirely on
an "efficiency" vision. According to that vision, if the net wel-
fare gain for all participants in the market outweighs the net
welfare loss, then the market is competitive. It matters not
from where the welfare gain flows or from where the loss aris-
es. In this way, any public policy concerns not related to the
efficiency of the market are minimized.12 Efficiency concerns
in the Chicago School antitrust model are, far and away, the
most significant concerns. This market analysis is very simple:
as more and more externalities are introduced, it becomes
increasingly difficult to look at a particular practice and say
whether it is efficient or inefficient. The Chicago School sets its
highest store on the effect of the particular behavior as far as
consumers are concerned, with its ultimate goal being the
pursuit of economic efficiency, based on a neo-classical price
theory model. Net efficiency gains, within this model, arise
from a combination of allocative efficiency and productive effi-
ciency. Under the Chicago School, high market concentrations
may not lead to the anticompetitive problems that liberal econ-
omists feared. The Chicago School analysis is less focused on
the dangers of monopoly, and therefore much less concerned
with protecting small competitors against larger rivals. The
Chicago model favors exploiting economies of scale, and mini-
mizes the "natural" barriers to market entry as a contributing
factor to potential anticompetitive behavior. It is generally
considered that at certain concentrations in the market, firms
would have to tacitly price fix-according to the Cournot eco-
nomic model. The Chicago economists have moved away from
this model, finding nothing wrong, per se, with a highly con-
centrated market.
12. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV.
213, 215, 223, 231 (1985).
369
BROOK. J. INTL L.
However, in Latin America, owing to the history of nation-
alization, state-owned or private monopolies abound. Even in
nonstate-owned industries, the free functioning of the market
has been severely disrupted by governmental price fixing and
the presence of extremely high levels of concentration. The
elimination of price controls in many of these countries is a
relatively recent phenomenon. In addition, the reliance on now
discredited import-substitution economic theories has led to a
large number of highly inefficient businesses. In light of this,
an antitrust policy aimed at encouraging efficiencies and at-
tacking monopolies could have some utility. Also, as a result of
the above, in many sectors, barriers to entry are very high.
Given the need for foreign investment in these economies, a
coherent antitrust policy must deal with these very high barri-
ers to entry.
There is, however, one significant problem in the Chicago
School's purely economic analysis that must be taken up here,
especially as it relates to the application of antitrust laws to
developing economies. The Chicago School assumes that net
welfare can be measured in constant dollars. In other words,
regardless of where the welfare gain takes place, its effect
must be the same. For example, the "transfer of one dollar
from a consumer to a monopolist has no welfare implications"
according to the Chicago School. 3 Clearly, there are major
social implications of this, and one can easily envisage a series
of facts where the loss of one dollar by a consumer is consid-
ered of greater effect than the gain of one dollar by a monopo-
list. In essence, our hypothesis starts from the basis that the
utility of a fixed sum differs, depending on the person to whom
it is given, or from whom it is taken.
The Chicago School economic policy maker would say that
any dollar given to anyone must have the same value as a
dollar given to anyone else. It is possible to measure this utili-
ty objectively by analyzing the difference that the transfer of
wealth makes to the person's behavior. For example, a poor
person's behavior may be markedly altered by a specific
amount, whereas a rich person's behavior may not be affected
at all by the same increase in wealth. In such a way, it is pos-
sible to actually produce empirical data to look at net welfare
13. Id. at 235.
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gains and losses, bearing in mind their overall utility and their
different relative values, and bearing in mind the different
ways they impact on different market participants.
When analyzing a market, one can look at the classical
definition, as coined by Pareto: a situation was optimal if no
change from that situation could make someone better off
without making someone worse off.'4 This was deemed unre-
alistic because its conditions could rarely be fulfilled, and
therefore, an alternative way of looking at efficiency emerged,
the so-called potential Pareto efficiency whereby a change was
regarded as efficient if the gains experienced by those who
gained outweighed the losses experienced by those who lost.
There are, nevertheless, practical problems in using such a
simple model. In a real world market economy, as is vividly
demonstrated in today's financial markets, every change im-
posed on one market affects dozens of other markets as well. It
is justified to say that allocative efficiency concepts must in-
clude everything to which people assign a value. This could
include those items that traditionally have been perceived to
be non-economic goals, such as increasing opportunities for
small businesses or a public policy objective of the diffusion of
power generally. The reason these have not formed the bedrock
of the economic analysis of, say, the Chicago School, is that
Chicago School economists look primarily at what consumers
want when they actually make purchasing decisions-and
consumers look for the best product at the lowest price regard-
less of who the producer actually is, or what its behavior has
been, either as a monopolist, or as a polluter, or indeed in any
other way.
One could argue, however, that the boycott cases are ex-
amples of where the simple Chicago School analysis does not
hold water. These are cases where the simple vision of supply
and demand-a manufacturer selling the best products at the
lowest cost-breaks down. A boycott occurs when the market is
controlled by consumers to the extent that they can operate
collectively to rid the market of a particular market partici-
pant, or change the behavior of that market participant, and
14. Pareto optimality is a standard economic concept that was developed by
Vilfredo Pareto in 1909. See VILFREDO PARETO, MANUEL D'ECONOMIE POLITIQUE
(1909); THOMAS J. MICELI, EcoNoMIcs OF THE LAW 4-6 (1997).
BROOK. J. INT'L L.
this has very little to do with supply and demand. 5 In these
cases, other factors are at play beyond simple price theory.
There are market externalities which explain what market
participants actually want. These market participants have set
a value on non-price factors which exceeds that value which
they assign to price. It is not sufficient that the supplier pro-
vides low-price products-they must behave in a certain way or
risk a boycott.
When considering how a free market should operate, we
must also consider whether allocative efficiency should be the
only guiding star. How much of a place should other socio-
economic goals have, such as the attraction of foreign invest-
ment or the building up of a particular industry sector?
There are some special features of the regional markets of
countries in Latin America that need to be considered here.
These countries vary widely from countries that can be genu-
inely characterized as developing to semi-industrialized, and
even a potential member of the OECD in Chile. There are
clearly major implications for antitrust policy in bringing such
disparate economies together, to say nothing of the micro-econ-
omies of some of the Caribbean. Indeed, at a national level,
there is the problem of introducing antitrust policy to econo-
mies in transition. It shows that it is particularly necessary for
us to consider the full implications of adopting the constant-
dollar hypothesis of the Chicago School. For example, the Do-
minican Republic has already gone on record as stating that
the development of the small and micro-enterprise sector is
critical to its sustained economic growth. 6 But what will hap-
pen to these businesses if they are immediately and
unguardedly exposed to massive foreign competition? This is a
dangerous area, as it could be misinterpreted as a suggestion
of managed trade. It therefore needs to be very carefully han-
dled. In addition, in many countries, a substantial part of the
economy consists of parallel or black markets, an issue that
could be addressed in an antitrust policy. With this in mind,
there are two different factors that must be considered here.
The first is how best to implement antitrust policy in the indi-
vidual countries. The second is to consider how over-arching
15. See, e.g., ETC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990).
16. Interview with Jaime David Fernandez, Vice President, Dominican Repub-
lic, in Miami, Fla. (July 1996).
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principles of antitrust might be best grounded in the national
economies of the region.
III. THE DOMESTIC CONTEXT
The preferred market model must take into account the
developmental stages of certain emerging economies. It must
take into account the economic objectives of the different na-
tions involved. There are certain Chicago School assumptions
which must be revisited, with special emphasis on the coun-
tries of Latin America and the Caribbean. It is clear that barri-
ers to entry in such a market can be and are significant fac-
tors. Foreign investors do face tariffs and other barriers, in-
cluding entrenched domestic rivals, difficulties in accessing all-
parts of the market, and unclear governmental regulations. We
also need to survey the industry sectors most affected to assess
the effects of concentration in those industry markets. At what
stage might oligopoly pricing occur? If it is likely to occur at
low levels of market concentration, then oligopoly becomes a
big problem, and a market where economies of scale are very
important must be resisted. Otherwise the region as a whole
will become anticompetitive, with consequent damage to its
citizens.
What is anecdotally true is that the Chicago School hy-
pothesis for what constitutes an efficient market may be par-
ticularly misleading where there is a mix of highly industrial-
ized countries and less developed countries. The Chicago
School analysis makes certain assumptions:
(a) Natural barriers to entry are more imagined than
real. Capital flows are now so efficient that investment
will flow into any market automatically where the rate
of return justifies it;
(b) A monopoly is generally self-correcting. This is be-
cause a monopolist's profits generally attract new entry
into the monopolist's market;
(c) Economies of scale are very important to efficiency.
Most industries operate most economically only at very
high levels of concentration; 7 and
17. See John S. McGee, Efficiency and Economics of Size, in INDUSTRIAL CON-
373
BROOK. J. INTL L.
(d) Business firms are profit maximizers, as opposed to
revenue maximizers or even simply pursuers of profit. In
any event, if one firm is a profit maximizer, then that
will result in all firms being drawn inexorably towards
that goal, since those firms will make profits at the cost
of other firms.
In the Latin American region as a whole, assumptions (a)
through (c) may not hold so true. Significant barriers to entry
have historically existed in Latin America, and these must still
be dealt with. We must deal with these problems in a careful
way, lest we produce a competition policy that has more to do
with politics than with the creation of an efficient market.
Once again, we advance carefully, bearing in mind the dangers
of slipping down the precipice on one side towards managed
trade, and on the other towards embracing the Chicago School
vision of a free market too early in a country's transition.
Broadly speaking, there could be a number of approaches
to ensure that predictable and certain antitrust principles are
grounded in national economies:
(a) Each Latin American country could move toward a
system of laws based on the same provisions. An agreed
text of competition law (a so-called "Global Competition
Code") could be part of the textual basis of the Free
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Such a project has
been undertaken by academics at the Max Planck Insti-
tute;
18
(b) A body of agreed-upon principles, which member
states would have to implement into their national law
on the basis of subsidiarily, and by delegated authority
from a hemispheric antitrust body (which could be a
coordinating forum of existing national antitrust bodies)
for the region; and
(c) Rules governing priority for prosecution and dealing
with which country's law should govern a particular
CENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 55 (Harvey J. Goldschmid et al. eds., 1974).
18. See International Antitrust Code Working Group, Draft International Code
as a GATT-MTO Plurilateral Trade Agreement, July 10, 1993, reprinted in 64
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1628 (Aug. 19, 1993) (Special Supp.).
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anticompetitive behavior pattern. This has been agreed
before by the EU-U.S. competition authorities (EU-U.S.
agreement-overruled by France v. European Commis-
sion)."9 The so-called positive comity doctrine is now
beginning to be relied on.2
The first approach is unlikely, simply because there are
too many competing interests, to say nothing of the loss of
sovereignty issue. Competition policy is, however, starting to
be regarded as a fitting subject for trade discussions. A compe-
tition group at the WTO level was set up at the Singapore
GATT Trade Ministerial. It is headed by Frederic Jenny, the
Vice President of the French Conseil de la Concurrence, Paris.
A competition working group forms part of the Free Trade
Area of the Americas negotiations.2' Note also that back in
1948, at the genesis of the GATT, competition provisions were
included in the draft Havana Charter.22 However, it is still
felt that a WTO Competition Code may be a long way off.
The third option does nothing to address the actual sub-
stantive problems in competition policy. It might be used in
some sort of tangential way to deal with extraterritoriality
problems, but in reality would do no more than this. It would
certainly do nothing to assist the Latin American countries in
setting up meaningful competition regimes that they actually
had the resources to enforce, and therefore would be only a
palliative remedy at best.
I submit that the second option alone can simultaneously
address the issues while not being so ambitious that it would
fall by the national sovereignty's sword. Though we must be
conscious of the rise of protectionism in the hemispheric re-
gion, as witnessed by the failure of the fast-track vote in the
19. See generally Commission Report to the Council and the European Parlia-
ment on the Application of the Agreement Between the European Communities
and the Government of the United States of America Regarding the Application of
Their Competition Laws, COM(96)479 final at 1(2), 4.4 [hereinafter Commission
Report].
20. See Alexander Schaub, Address at the Fordham Corporate Law Institute
24th Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy (Oct. 16-17,
1997) (discussing the European investigation into U.S. complaints about carteliza-
tion in European airline ticket reservation systems).
21. The competition group is chaired by Peru's Vice-Minister for Trade.
22. See U.S. Dept. of State, Havana Charter for an International Trade Orga-
nization, Pub. No. 3206, Commercial Policy Series No. 114 (1948).
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U.S. Congress,' there is a significant requirement in such a
set-up: in order to have such a system there must be some
supranational body or agency to administer the system, and
more importantly, to ensure that the guiding principles as set
out in the form of a Free Trade Agreement are properly adopt-
ed by the different member states.
A look back at history is instructive here. The Havana
Charter merely obliges members to take appropriate measures
to ensure that private commercial enterprises do not restrain
trade. In the event of complaints, the ITO would be the body
authorized to investigate and demand information and then
recommend remedial action by its member governments. The
member states' remedial measures were to be monitored by the
ITO. The Havana Charter contains strong competition lan-
guage in its Code. For example, Chapter Two of the Charter
states that member nations must work to eliminate sub-stan-
dard conditions of labor. Chapter Four relates to commercial
policy, requiring a ban on quantitative import and export re-
strictions, and mandating consultation between members in
the area of subsidies. Furthermore, Chapter Four also places
state trading institutions in the same boat as private trading
organizations, while calling for the removal of hidden barriers
to trade, such as the use of "vexatious formalities" and rules of
origin. Chapter Five deals with "restrictive business practices."
Members agree to prevent such practices on the part of monop-
olies and cartels which have harmful effects on the expansion
of production and trade. The practices listed include price-fix-
ing, exclusion from markets, allocating customers, fixing pro-
duction quotas, and suppressing technology. It is expressly
envisaged that complaints about anticompetitive practices will
be dealt with by the administrative structure of the ITO. The
Latin American interest will be intimately connected with the
growth of privatization in the market. This will result in the
increased importance of anti-monopoly laws to deal with the
problems of state enterprises. There is a particularly strong
23. The bill, S. 9627, 105th Cong. (1997), entitled the "Export Expansion and
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1997" was pulled from the floor of the House
of Representatives for lack of support among House Democrats, who accepted labor
union arguments that giving the President authority to negotiate trade agreements
would lead to the export of U.S. jobs. Ironically, lack of fast track may well have
the effect of exporting U.S. jobs while shifting the balance of U.S. jobs from
skilled to unskilled workers.
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mandate for the type of regional institution of which the Euro-
pean Commission Competition Directorate is the prime exam-
ple. So let us now consider how the European Union uses its
own internal institutions to enforce competition law.
IV. ENFORCEMENT OF COMPETITION LAW IN EUROPE
The European competition laws take precedence over the
member states' competition laws, although many member
states already have their own laws, and are in the process of
implementing the provisions of the European Commission
Treaty into national law. These will apply if the business
transaction is within a member state and does not affect trade
between members of the European Union. The European Com-
mission has extensive investigatory powers under Regulation
17.' These apply, notwithstanding the provisions of national
law. In addition, the European Commission generally has the
power to issue directives, which mandate member state gov-
ernments to enact law along the basis of the directive. In the
UK, an attempt to redraft the Competition Act so that it would
be in compliance with European Commission principles fell
victim to election politics.' By comparison with this institu-
tion, a Hemispheric Antitrust Institute (the Institute) could
have broad powers akin to the European Commission to inves-
tigate, and request that member states enforce their competi-
tion and antitrust laws. Information going to the Institute
could therefore be kept confidential from the different member
state nations, and prevent the current confidentiality problems
whereby the United States and European Union are unwilling
(or in the U.S. case unable for constitutional reasons), to reveal
information to other enforcement authorities.
There is another reason why a hemispheric institution
would be useful. This concerns the problem already alluded to
in terms of labor and the environment. The European Union
and United States may fear the rise of low-priced imports,
coming in on the back of little labor regulation and environ-
mental protections. Manufacturers here are already lobbying
24. See Council Regulation 17/62, art. 14, 1962 J.O. (204), 1959-62 O.J. SPEC.
ED. 87 [hereinafter Council Regulation 17/621.
25. See James Blitz & David Wighton, Cabinet Shelves Two Bills Dealing With
Business Law, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1996, at 1.
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national governments to reestablish barriers to low-priced
goods by invoking anti-dumping and other trade legislation. Of
course, the real way of dealing with this issue is to ensure that
adequate environmental and labor standards prevail in the
world, rather than seeking to address the problem by increas-
ing protectionism. I argue that in order to address this very
real problem it is necessary to have a single defining vision of
what the aims of competition law should be in the hemisphere,
and without that there will simply be a combination of special
interest issues which will continue to collide. By articulating
this vision I consider that the aim of the market must be only
this: to maximize total global welfare, regardless of the gains
which accrue specifically to nations. As increasingly national
markets no longer hold up as valid antitrust markets, and re-
gional and global markets apply, some thought has to be given
about how well-placed national authorities are to enforce anti-
trust laws. Different national laws, provided that efficiency is
the ultimate goal, will not necessarily give rise to increased
costs. A hemispheric institution is perfectly placed to stand
above disputes between nations as increasingly market access
issues are fought in the competition arena. If the real problem
is dispute resolution, then there should be a body that stands
above the concerns of individual national interests at least
insofar as these disputes are between nations. The prospect of
the WTO becoming such a forum is remote. In the meantime,
there should be an alternative.
One of the central problems in the antitrust enforcement
area is that "most nations do not prohibit firms from taking
anticompetitive actions which harm 'only' foreigners."26 Such
conduct undoubtedly interferes with global markets and reduc-
es total social welfare. It is a problem that must be addressed.
The problem, however, is that conduct in one jurisdiction may
be so remote from the site of harm, that choice of law issues
may be raised when attempting to determine the law that
applies to the dispute. The problem is exacerbated if the cartel
behavior is in some way government-sponsored, as may occur
in developing economies if these markets are exposed to for-
eign competition too quickly. Therefore, meaningful competi-
26. Eleanor Fox, Competition Law and the Agenda for the WTO: Forging the
Links of Competition and Trade, 4 PAc. RIM L. & POLY J. 1, 19 (1995).
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tion principles should address the Act of State doctrine, and
prevent the formation of export cartels, and the like. Tradition-
ally, the Act of State doctrine has fallen into the constitution-
al/political realm, and therefore has not been dealt with by
trade or competition law. Eleanor Fox27 has discussed the les-
sons that can be learned from the EU's approach to this prob-
lem. In the European Union, all trade law has been
reconceptualized, Fox argues, as a distortion of competition
problem. And in Europe, it is the economic interests of the EU,
as a community of trading nations in whose public good all
these problems must be resolved. Hence, the Europeans rightly
bring anti-dumping, subsidies, countervailing duties and anti-
trust policy all within the same broad heading.
V. ANTI-DUmpING
There is a powerful argument that anti-dumping laws
have no place in the world trading order. Certainly the Europe-
ans would want the dumping problem addressed. Within Eu-
rope, charging dumping duties is illegal. But in the North
American Free Trade Act (NAFTA), anti-dumping laws remain,
and the United States is adamant that the subject is simply
not on the table for discussion. If product is coming into the
U.S. market, U.S. predatory pricing laws, or some other cost-
based alternative, could be used to stop the practice if the
product is truly coming in below marginal cost. Otherwise
there should be no reason to protect domestic industry from
more competitive rivals, provided critically that those products
do not have artificially low costs as a result of violation of
agreed-upon labor rights or environmental provisions. To
sound a note of caution, however, in the current mood of pro-
tectionism, the use of trade remedies may soon increase in the
United States, rather than decrease as they were once expect-
ed to do.'m
27. See id. at 29.
28. Many examples of the rhetoric of protectionism may be found in the fast
track debate which led ultimately to the recall of the bill from the House, prior to
a vote being taken.
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VI. SUBSIDIES
Subsidies are inefficient. They tamper with markets, and
disturb the key relationship between price to consumers and
marginal cost of manufacture. They can lead to the building up
of inefficient industries. As a result, resources are not efficient-
ly allocated. Once again, the European Commission model is
instructive. State aids are within the competence of the Com-
petition Directorate. Under the EU system, state aids must be
reported and justified, or eliminated.29
VII. GLOBAL WELFARE
It is clear from the foregoing that there must be some
institution capable of assessing what conduct is in the global
interest or, at the very least, in the regional interest, leaving
aside the individual concerns of nations. The great debate on
extraterritoriality, and the controversy about who should pros-
ecute, and when are indicators that this is an idea whose time
has arrived. In addition, markets are very closely interconnect-
ed due to the increased integration of trade and capital. Once
again, the European Union provides powerful lessons, if not a
road map for closer hemispheric integration. The European
Commission Treaty prevents restraints on the freedom of
movement, capital and persons. Now, competition law and free
movement are inseparably connected.
VIii. BRAZIL: RECENT DECISIONS OF THE BRAZILIAN
COMPETITION AUTHORITY (CADE)
Prior to analyzing key differences between EU and U.S.
law, and how they might be used to inform other countries'
national laws, it is worth seeing what Brazil's competition
authority has done with some recent decisions. The recent
decisions of CADE, which I will discuss, are the acquisition by
Colgate/Palmolive of a Brazilian tooth products manufacturer,
Kolynos, and the two recent decisions in the brewing sector,
featuring Miller Brewing and Anheuser-Busch.
In the ColgatefKolynos case, Colgate-Palmolive sought to
acquire Kolynos, the largest producer of toothpaste in Brazil.
The acquisition would have given Colgate control of about 75%
29. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 92-94; Fox, supra note 26, at 26.
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of the Brazilian toothpaste market. CADE's decision was to
allow the acquisition only if Colgate did not use the KOLYNOS
brand name for four years, or granted a 20 year license to
another company. CADE found that there were four product
markets in the oral health care industry, and that the acquisi-
tion would have anticompetitive effects in only one, the tooth-
paste market. However Colgate argued that the oral care mar-
ket was the entire market. There was very little emphasis on
the supply-side analysis, i.e., if a price change occurred for one
product, at what level would manufacturers of 'other products'
switch manufacturing to manufacture the other product. There
was also an assumption that the relevant market was the
national market, notwithstanding the acceptance that
MERCOSUR might be the actual geographic market.
In the brewing decisions, the major U.S. brewing compa-
nies had both negotiated exclusive distribution agreements
with two of Brazil's brewers. Prior to the agreements, the mar-
ket was a virtual duopoly between two Brazilian breweries,
Brahma and Antarctica, although the market share of
CocaCola-backed Kaiser was increasing. CADE ordered that
the exclusive agreements of 20 years should be cut back to 24
months from the date of CADE's decisions' publication. This
time period was based on the assumption that without such an
agreement the U.S. brewer would build a brewing plant, and
that was the approximate length of time that a plant would
take to build. Once again, CADE relied on the potential compe-
tition theory that a joint venture of this type was
anticompetitive because it foreclosed the market to a potential
competitor, the U.S. brewer.
A number of themes are beginning to emerge out of these,
and other recent cases. One is the way markets are defined,
which is so critical to merger analysis. The other is the reli-
ance on the potential competition theory. This will be very
important, since it is a concept which might have a chilling
effect on foreign investment in Brazil, if not very carefully
applied. In particular, the CADE decision minimized the im-
portance of market entry barriers in the application of poten-
tial competition theory and other opportunities which are
available in other markets.
The current U.S. interpretation of the potential competi-
tion theory assumes that if the outsider is prevented from
acquiring or joint venturing with the insider, it will still enter
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the market de novo to establish a toe-hold. The theory itself
has been criticized. Judge Posner has said that it is impossible
to develop criteria for determining the application of the theory
to specific mergers." Principally, there are two theories, per-
ceived potential competition, and the doctrine of actual poten-
tial competition. The first has not been validated, while the
second has largely fallen into disuse. The theory emanated
from the Celler-Kefavaer Amendments to the Clayton Act, and
as such was really directed towards the unpopularity of large
conglomerate mergers. CADE's decision in the brewing cases
draws more on the actual potential competition doctrine, and is
concerned with the possibility of independent entry by Miller
Brewing and Anheuser-Busch into the Brazilian beer market.
In any event, if the doctrine is to be applied, a number of
things must be shown:
(a) You must establish that the market is concentrated;
(b) You must show the existence of other potential com-
petitors;
(c) There must be a reasonable probability that the po-
tential competitor will enter the market independently;
and
(d) You must demonstrate that the potential competitor's
entry would have significant pro-competitive benefits.31
Evidence needs to be gathered on all of these points. To
use potential competition theories without satisfying the above
will be a dangerous thing to do, particularly for an economy
like Brazil's, which is in need of injections of foreign invest-
ment as it joins the global economy. If you are resting your
theory on perceived potential competition, there must be proof
that the acquiror had the capability and incentive to render it
a perceived potential entrant, and must be one of only a few
firms with such characteristics.
30. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 113-
25 (1978).
31. See Mercantile Texas Corp. v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve, 638
F.2d 1255 (5th Cir. 1981).
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In order to answer the third factor in the affirmative,
market entry barriers must not be so high as to deter entry.
More importantly, you must be satisfied that when faced with
the inability to enter the market in the manner of its choosing,
the 'potential competitor' will actually continue to pursue op-
portunities in that market and will not simply turn to other
easier markets. The acquiring firm must be shown to have the
capability and incentive to enter the market independently.
Questions like what would be the expected profits for indepen-
dent entry need to be addressed in the analysis. Without as-
sessing whether this was or was not the case in the CADE
decision, there is little evidence put forth either way.'
There also needs to be analysis of who the other potential
competitors actually were. If there were numerous other poten-
tial competitors, then elimination of one would have a negligi-
ble effect on competition. But potential competition can only be
applied in cases where an acquisition might be deemed
anticompetitive if it results in the elimination of "the prospect
of independent entry by a firm whose pre-merger presence on
the fringe of the market was perceived by... current market
participants."32 The question in the brewing cases should have
therefore been whether the U.S. brewers' 1% market share in
Brazil pre-merger had this disciplining effect on the duopoly of
Brahma and Antarctica.
IX. U.S. JURISPRUDENCE ON POTENTIAL COMPETITION THEORY
The Supreme Court of the United States has twice re-
served judgement on whether the theory is valid at all.33 Very
few courts validated the theory, and case law is rare. Indeed it
has been condemned by the FTC as a "rather peculiar theory of
competitive injury."' Many commentators have criticized the
theory on the basis that it was designed to attack conglomerate
mergers.35 Rather, what should be focused on is the preven-
tion of mergers which would result in harm to consumers from
32. Mark D. Whitener, Potential Competition Theory-Forgotten But Not Gone,
5 ANTITRUST 17, 18 (1991).
-33. See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 625 (1974);
United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 537 (1973).
34. B.A.T. Industries, 104 F.T.C. 852, 919 (1984).
35. See Richard Hoerner, Innovation Markets: New Wine in Old Bottles?, 64
ANTITRUST L.J. 49, 50-55 (1995).
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the exercise of market power. As far as the actual potential
competition theory is concerned, it is clear that different cir-
cuits in U.S federal courts have different standards. For exam-
ple, the Fourth Circuit requires "clear proof' that the acquiring
firm would in fact have entered the market, the Second
Circuit's standard is merely that the acquiror "Would likely"
have entered the relevant market, and the Fifth Circuit says
the plaintiff must show a "reasonable probability" of entry."
What is clear is that a detailed examination of the firm's capa-
bilities, interest, and incentive to enter the market must be
considered."
There had been some resurgence of the theory during
Commissioner Steiger's term at the FTC, and there are a cou-
ple of 1990 FTC Consent Orders relaxing the previous stan-
dard of "clear proof' that was required in order to show that an
alleged actual potential entrant would have entered indepen-
dently. But even here, there were some narrow parameters put
around the application of the theory. The prospective entrant
had to be willing and able to imminently enter the market
which is not now performing competitively. The FTC has also
used the potential competition theory in the vertical area, but
only where there was a claim that the acquisition eliminated
potential competition by making assets unavailable that might
attract others to enter a market upstream from the markets
actually involved in the acquisition.38
Currently, potential competition theory is really reserved
for cases where the potential competitor is engaged in research
and development work, which might lead to a potentially com-
petitive product and that "innovation" is prevented by the
merger, i.e., it relates to the prevention of R&D and techno-
logical advancement.39
Also, the pro-competitive effect of independent entry needs
to be illustrated. The mere addition of one competitor in the
market will not be sufficient, neither will the mere entry of a
large firm in a concentrated market.
36. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, Ch.
HIC (4th ed. 1997).
37. Id. at 347.
38. See File No. 901-0010, proposed consent order, 55 Fed. Reg. 37,759 (1990),
Final Order Accepted, 55 Fed. Reg. 51,963 (1990).
39. See Wright Medical Technology, Inc., 60 Fed. Reg. 460 (1995); Boston
Scientific, 60 Fed. Reg. 12,948 (1995); Hoechst AG, 60 Fed. Reg. 49,609 (1995).
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X. KEY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EU AND U.S. COMPETITION
ANTITRUST LAW
The evolution of U.S. antitrust law has arisen out of a
deep-rooted distrust of political and economic power.0 Subse-
quently in the 1960s and 1970s, U.S. antitrust laws were used
to help small businesses. Gradually, however, as the U.S. econ-
omy changed, efficiency became the most important thing to
consider in the administration of U.S. antitrust laws. The eco-
nomic efficiency vision of the Chicago School became the most
important view. Since cartels were inefficient, enforcement
against the cartels became almost the only enforcement relied
on during the Reagan years. Mergers were rarely challenged.
In Europe, competition law developed for very different
reasons. Jean Monnet's vision of a unified Europe was founded
on two basic theses. The first was that greater unity was a
moral imperative after the ravages of two wars. The second
was an economic imperative. The businesses of the crippled
European economies needed to be able to better compete with
their rivals in the United States and elsewhere. In order to be
competitive on efficiencies of scale and so forth, the Europeans
needed to be able to encourage transnational mergers. Howev-
er, once the region was unified, it became necessary to ensure
that businesses themselves did not cartelize the region, even
though European competition law focused on giving assistance
to small and medium-sized enterprises.
Hence, European law contains the Article 86 provisions on
abuse of a dominant position. Dominance is much easier to
prove than monopoly under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. As
such, dominant firms are precluded from excessive pricing, and
so forth. Examples of Article 86 actions abound, whereas Sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act actions are comparatively rare.
Similarly, merger law, specifically in the form of a merger
regulation, in the European Commission developed much later,
since one of the goals of the European Commission in the first
place was to encourage such merger activity. A merger regula-
tion has only been in place for seven years. Under the Europe-
an merger law, the Europeans are concerned not only with
price increases, but also with the merger's potential
40. See Eleanor Fox, Antitrust, Trade and the Twenty-First Century-Rounding
the Circle, 48 REC. NYC BAR ASS'N 535, 539 (1993).
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exclusionary effects on smaller competitors, and proof of output
reduction is not the only guide.
European competition law is much broader than its U.S.
counterpart. Free movement is an integral part of EU competi-
tion law. European competition policy extends to the areas of
anti-dumping and state aids. Most recently this has been en-
forced by European Competition Commissioner Karel van
Miert, in the area of aid to small businesses.
What the Europeans have that the United States does not,
is a unified vision of antitrust, trade and investment rules, and
trade regulation all subsumed within the competition area. It
is worth noting that the European Commission and the United
States have agreed to cooperate in the application of their
competition laws, though the agreement was first voided on a
technicality and then reapplied. A report produced by the Eu-
ropean Commission on the application of this agreement was
published on October 8, 1996."' The report reveals that the
agreement itself provides that cases which concern the impor-
tant'interests of the other party be notified to them. Exchange
of information on general matters is mandated. Both parties'
competition authorities must cooperate and be coordinated.
Each party must take into account the interests of the other
when it takes measures to enforce its competition rules. Either
party may take appropriate measures in respect of
anticompetitive behavior that takes place on its territory, but
whose effect is felt in the territory of the other party.
Most of the notifications that have taken effect to this
point have been in the mergers area. The European Commis-
sion, once it notifies the United States, must notify the mem-
ber states whose interests are affected. Timing is obviously
key. The Microsoft case is an example of how coordinated ac-
tion can be taken at the same time. An attempt has been made
for case handlers on each side of the Atlantic to assess each
other's view of the competitive effects of the transaction in
their market. Clearly, market analysis is an area where there
is a substantial amount of duplicative effort which is wasted
and should be avoided. However, the inability of the European
Commission and the United States to exchange confidential
information is still a major stumbling block, especially if the
41. Commission Report, supra note 19.
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two authorities adopt different definitions of the market.
Kimberly-Clark/Scott Paper42 shows that even if the product
market is identical, a different geographical market can lead to
different results and requirements for divestiture. The United
States and European Commission cooperated in the
Glaxo/Wellcome joint venture,43 where there were a number of
quite distinct product markets. This case demonstrated the
different approaches that the FTC and the European Commis-
sion take. The European Commission required that the merged
company license one of the two anti-migraine treatments and
so retain a competitor, while the FTC required full divestiture
of Wellcome's R & D for this particular anti-migraine treat-
ment. Regarding geographical market analysis, the European
Commission and the U.S. authorities tend to focus on effects in
their own markets exclusively. There are, however, some ex-
amples where the European Commission already recognizes a
global market: in Lockheed Martin/Loral,' the European
Commission accepted that the satellite market was a global
one. Nevertheless, U.S. authorities took the view that the
United States was the relevant market because of, among
other things, differences in price, quality, and/or technology
between U.S. and non-U.S. manufacturers.
In certain cases, if the parties consent, U.S. and European
Commission authorities may discuss information. There is a
process by which the European Commission may respond to
requests for information.45 In addition, there are areas where
the authorities have cooperated to help each other to locate in-
formation which is of public record, but may not necessarily be
information to which the authority unassisted would have been
directed. For example, in the Lockheed Martin/Loral merger,
the FTC drew the European Commission's attention to infor-
mation filed with the SEC, which was public, but which the
European Commission would not necessarily have looked for
42. European Commission, XXVIth Report on Competition Policy, § 11.10
(1996).
43. European Commission Decision Declaring a Concentration to be Compati-
ble with the Common Market, Case No. IV/M.555, Glaxo Wellcome Plc, 1995 O.J.
(C 65) 3.
44. European Commission Decision Declaring a Concentration to be Compati-
ble with the Common Market, Case No. IV/M.697, Lockheed Martin/Loral Corp.,
1996 O.J. (C 314) 9.
45. See Council Regulation No. 17/62, supra note 24, art. 11.
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without such notification. Cooperation is also important when
clarifying a point of foreign law which is relevant to the agree-
ment or to the efficacy of a remedy. Waivers can also be useful
in allowing the different agencies to discuss remedies in specif-
ic cases, and to exchange documents disclosing anticompetitive
behavior.
The positive comity provisions have now been invoked,4
though it is too early to tell how effective the positive comity
doctrine will be in its application. Also, there have been many
examples of either of the authorities delaying their own action,
pending the action of the others, and keeping in close contact
with that action. The European Commission has gone on re-
cord as saying that it would welcome European businesses' re-
sponse to whether and how best it should seek to use the posi-
tive comity provisions to push U.S. authorities to investigate
examples of where anticompetitive behavior in the United
States threatens the ability of Europeans to compete. Although
the European Commission report focuses on cooperation in the
merger area, greater possibilities for cooperation may present
themselves in non-merger cases, such as international price
cartels. In these areas, the restrictions on the exchange of
confidential information have been felt at their keenest. This is
particularly so in the investigation of cartels. If elimination of
cartels is to remain the priority of competition policy generally,
there needs to be a way around the impasse on the restrictions
on exchange of confidential information. It is here that the role
of a body standing above national might begin to make some
sense.
It will be a significant element of antitrust policy to deter-
mine whether certain behavior should be classified as per se
illegal, whether a rule of reason should be universally applied,
or whether antitrust policy should be informed by concepts of
dominance (more prevalent in the European system). Concepts
of dominance are thought to encourage small competitors to
compete against their larger rivals, as opposed to a pure
allocative efficiency analysis which promotes efficiencies and
focuses on behavior which lowers price for consumers. In coun-
tries, particularly in the Caribbean, where small businesses
are a vital part of the economy, it may be necessary to apply
46. See Commission Report, supra note 19.
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dominance concepts, in order to ensure that small economies
might more easily make the transition to a free market.
XI. PROCEDURAL DIFFERENCES
Procedural differences between EU and U.S. law are the
most immediately obvious area of difference. Generally, in the
analysis of vertical restraints, U.S. law applies a rule of reason
analysis as described above. However, under EU law, one
would have to ascertain whether the restrictions contravene
Article 85(1), and if they do, to seek a block exemption or an
individual exemption from the European Commission.4' This
procedure has proved successful in promoting a certain and
predictable business climate. The European Commission does
issue comfort letters, and this procedure has been followed in
Venezuela, for example. However, the comfort letter procedure
(which is non-binding) has been criticized.
Private enforcement is still comparatively rare in Europe.
In the United States, most enforcement is done at the private
party level, largely because, unlike in Europe, juries decide
damages, and in the area of antitrust, treble damages apply.
Joint ventures are classified differently. If a venture is
classified as a consolidation in Europe (rather than a collabora-
tion), then it is analyzed under the Merger Control Rules, and
if it falls below the reporting thresholds, it will certainly not be
challenged. In the United States, joint ventures are regarded
as creatures in between full mergers and separate entities, to
which a rule of reason analysis will be generally applied.
XII. ANALYSIS OF LATIN AMERICAN COMPETITION LAV48
Until the beginning of this decade, competition policy in
Latin America had taken a back seat. Competition laws were
enacted prior to this, to be sure, but in environments where
47. See Commission Regulation 1983/83 of June 30, 1983, 1983 O.J. (L 173) 1;
Commission Regulation 1984/83 of June 22, 1983, 1983 O.J. (L 173) 5; Commission
Regulation 417/85 of Feb. 22, 1985, 1985 O.J. (L 53) 1; Commission Regulation
418/85 of Feb. 22, 1985, 1985 O.J. (L 53) 5; Commission Regulation 4087/88 of
Dec. 28, 1988, 1988 O.J. (L 359) 46.
48. Luis TINE0, COMPETITION POLICY & LAW IN LATIN AMEmICA FROM Dis-
TRIBUTIVE REGULATIONS TO MARKET EFFICIENCY (Monterey Inst., Ctr. for Trade &
Com. Dipl., Working Paper No. 4, 1997) (on file with Brooklyn Journal of Interna-
tional Law).
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government intervention in markets was the norm these laws
had little effect. However recently, Latin American countries
have started to enact more modern competition laws. Many of
the Latin American countries have enacted legislation address-
ing the competition issue. Argentina enacted such a law in
1980, Brazil in 1994, Colombia amended its law in 1992, Chile
in 1979, Costa Rica in 1994, Mexico in 1992, Panama in 1996,
Peru in 1991, and Venezuela in 1991. A number of other coun-
tries are currently discussing legislation. Regionally, only
NAFTA includes competition provisions although there is some
discussion of this within MERCOSUR and CARICOM. The
view of the Organization of American States (OAS) is that laws
in the region target the promotion of freedom in industry and
commerce, equitable participation of small and medium sized
enterprises, and the decentralization of economic power. Em-
phasis should be placed on preventing monopolistic behavior,
and abuse of dominant position, much more like the European
system. A number of Latin American laws are very closely
modeled on the European system. Many countries have carved
out certain exclusions. Mexico, by way of example, does not
apply its competition laws to the petroleum, natural gas sec-
tors or to export cooperatives. Chilean competition law ex-
cludes mining and petroleum. In Costa Rica, insurance activi-
ties, alcohol distillation, fuels, activities carried out by the
concessionary regime and telephone, telecommunications, elec-
tric energy and water services are excluded from competition.
In Colombia, household public services, and the financial and
insurance sectors are excluded. However, of course, the United
States also has such exemptions, both by statute and by the
application of the state action doctrine.
There are a number of commonalities among all Latin
American laws. For example, certain matters are prohibited
and these include:
(a) Price-fixing;
(b) Restriction of market access for new competitors by
making the sunk costs of potential competitors more
onerous;
(c) Bid-rigging or coordination in presentation of bids at
public procurement auctions;
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(d) Restraint of output agreements by quota imposition;
(e) Market and consumer division agreements; and
(f) Predatory practices adopted by a dominant company
to force out or prevent entry of competitors by selling at
prices below production cost.
Certain vertical agreements are also generally illegal:
(a) Price discrimination agreements;
(b) Resale price maintenance;
(c) Territorial restraint agreements by which a supplier
confines a distributor to market a product in a certain
territory;
(d) Exclusive agreements under which a distributor
obtains the right to sell and market a product under the
condition of not trading the other product;
(e) Tying arrangements; and
(f) Refusal to do business based on a supplier's stronger
negotiation position.
The U.S.-style per se rule of reason classification has not
generally been used in the design of laws by countries in the
region except in the cases of Mexico, Panama, and Costa Rica.
In Brazil, all potentially anticompetitive behavior is analyzed
by a rule of reason. In Argentina and Brazil, in order for a
behavior to be anticompetitive, there must be a demonstrable
threat to a nation's economic interests. In Venezuela, horizon-
tal agreements are per se unlawful, and a rule of reason analy-
sis is applied to vertical agreements. This looks like the U.S.
law, but Venezuelan law is based also on European dominance
concepts. In their enforcement, all countries rely on U.S. juris-
prudence.
In Latin American competition law, with the exception of
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Mexico or Costa Rica, it is abuse of a dominant position, not
the attempt to monopolize, which is to be penalized. This is
something of a double-edged sword. The reason is that al-
though European law seeks to find out what is actually being
done by the monopolist and U.S. law penalizes attempts to
become a monopolist, it is in practice a lot easier to demon-
strate that someone has a dominant position, than that they
are in fact a monopolist under the U.S. antitrust laws. Gener-
ally, in Latin America, the abuse of a dominant position is
predicated on the following factors:
(a) Degree of concentration of the market, existence of
barriers to entry, and dynamics of competition in the
relevant market; and
(b) Abuse of that position through the performance of
additional anticompetitive acts.
In order to ease analysis, Colombia, Chile, and Venezuela
actually specify the type of conduct that constitutes abuse of
dominant position. This includes things like price discrimina-
tion, restriction of output and distribution, refusal to deal for
the purchase or performance of services, discriminatory prac-
tices to impose unequal conditions for performance of services,
and tying agreements.
Economic concentrations are universally disapproved of,
because this establishes the platform for abuse of a dominant
position. However, doing the necessary analysis to establish
how an increased level of concentration can affect competition
is no easy task. This analysis requires a tremendous amount of
economic and legal analysis associated with considerable man-
power. Broadly, the guidelines used by these countries include:
(a) Relevant market defined by product and geographic
content;
(b) Pre-and-post-operation concentration levels, mea-
sured by sales volume, and the value of assets, and the
value of the transaction;
(c) Level of competition among participants in terms of
number of competitors, production capacity, and product
demand;
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(d) Barriers to entry of competitors; and
(e) History of competition and rivalry between partici-
pants in the sector or activity.
In Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela, this evaluation allows
us to take into consideration the increases in efficiency which
the new operation might produce. The analysis includes the
possibility that the merger took place purely to strengthen
certain companies, and not necessarily to boost efficiency. Bra-
zil, Chile, Jamaica, and Venezuela follow a model whereby
certain exceptions are authorized for practices that help en-
hance economic efficiency with respect both to market partici-
pants and consumers. This mirrors the European approach.
These exceptions have been specifically applied to:
(a) Export agreements;
(b) Agreements on research & development;
(c) Exclusive distribution and purchase agreements;
(d) Agreements which help to improve output, quality
and marketing of goods or services; and
(e) Exclusive agreements, as in the case of exemptions
and territorial representations.
Mexican, Brazilian, and Venezuelan laws also have de
minimis exceptions.
Many of the countries' competition laws are connected
with the deregulation of the economy. Determination of the
limits of state intervention are very important in developing
country markets, particularly those whose industries have
been shielded from competition for so long and have levels of
inefficiency built up over a period of years, if not decades.
Hence, in many countries the laws allow the competition agen-
cies to issue orders or regulations to amend or rescind existing
legislation when such legislation generates barriers to the
entry of participants. The wave of privatization must be closely
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monitored to ensure that the potential for the build up of pri-
vate economic concentrations is controlled. Agencies in Mexico,
Brazil, and Venezuela have the power to evaluate the effect
that a privatization might have on competition.
XIII. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA
A. Introduction
Enforcement is perhaps the area where there is the great-
est problem in antitrust policy in Latin America. Although the
agencies have the power to conduct investigations, and may
issue recommendations to firms prior to actually taking specif-
ic action, there is little' positive evidence that this is happen-
ing. Significantly, breaches of these laws are still thought to be
in the public domain, and private actions, as in the United
States are not generally countenanced. Private parties may,
nevertheless, request that the agencies take action in most
jurisdictions. Once a decision comes down, private parties may,
in certain jurisdictions (for example, Mexico), sue for damages,
thus leaving some sanction under private law. Essentially, the
agencies can nullify the transaction, impose fines, and impose
individual liability for damages.
Fines can be substantial. Violators can suffer fines of up to
20% of annual sales in Mexico, Costa Rica, and Venezuela.
Argentina can impose fines of up to 20% of the profit obtained.
In Argentina, Chile, and Jamaica, criminal sanctions can be
imposed for transgressing the prohibitions. In all Latin Amer-
ican countries, there is the possibility of judicial review from
the agencies' decision. This takes place through the court sys-
tem once the appeal process, if there is one, has been exhaust-
ed.
B. Role of the Antitrust Authority
As the protectionist backlash is felt throughout Latin
America, one significant role which the antitrust authorities in
the region could play is as an advocate for free trade with the
national government, on the one hand, and act as a counter-
weight to protectionism on the other.49 One of the most signif-
49. Malcolm Coate et al., Antitrust in Latin America: Regulating Government
and Business, 24 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 37 (1992).
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icant elements of the job of competition or antitrust authorities
is the release of opinions and statements about how the au-
thority intends to enforce antitrust law in specific areas (either
by industry sector, or by type of anticompetitive behavior). One
challenge for the Latin American authorities is the civil law
tradition in which they are rooted. Under that tradition, it is
only the underlying statute that has legal significance. The
importance attached to statements of policy and so forth that
inures in the United States and European systems needs to be
ingrained so that an antitrust body of law develops in the
countries of the region. The civil law tradition is no automatic
bar to this.5"
But, as things stand, the countries differ greatly in their
stated purposes for competition law. For example, Bolivia's
Constitution merely states that the economic structure must be
such that it is in harmony with principles of social justice with
a view to ensuring that all residents enjoy a humane standard
of living. The Sectoral Regulation Laws in Bolivia are designed
to ensure efficiency in the monitored sectors, which are tele-
communications, electric, energy, transportation, and water. In
Brazil, there are no per se offenses. All prohibited conduct is
determined by a rule of reason. In Brazil, natural monopolies
arising out of greater economic efficiency are not illegal. In-
deed, actors may get individual exemptions from the competi-
tion laws provided their actions have as their objective, cumu-
latively or alternatively, increasing productivity, or improving
the quality of goods or services.
XIV. INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY ANTITRUST REGIMES
This paper, having made some general conclusions, will
now analyze competition laws in specific groupings of coun-
tries. These groupings mirror those chosen by the OAS in its
study of comparative Latin American competition laws.
50. Although all but one of the European countries (the U.K.) have civil law
systems, and the European Court of Justice has historically used a European style
rendering of its judgments, no one would dispute the fact that there is a body of
European antitrust law, or that European Commission statements &arry great
weight in subsequent legal analysis.
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A. Chile, Dominican Republic, and Guatemala
In many Latin American countries, much of the antitrust
law is to be found in National Constitutions or in the criminal
law. Chilean law focuses on the prevention of monopolies and
monopolistic practices. Dominican law is somewhat two-faced,
stating that consumers must be protected and that the Govern-
ment must retain the ability to exercise certain economic and
strategic activities. In Chile, Article 6 of the law provides that
monopolistic market position means not only a monopoly, but
also applies to firms with dominant positions, whether the
firms are monopolies or not. State monopolies are still permit-
ted in law in the Dominican Republic (DR). In Chile, there are
a number of Commissions and enforcement organizations, but
it is unclear how effective this complicated structure is proving
although it is certainly true that a number of decisions have
been handed down by the relevant authorities. In Chile there
is no predetermined legal setting for procedures before the
Commissions. Although the authorities can impose major pen-
alties, such as prison sentences, only a fine of up to U.S.
$540,000 can be imposed. In addition, prison sentences only
apply if the conduct relates to essential services. In the DR,
penalties are minimal and are unlikely to have any significant
different effect.
B. Jamaica, Mexico, and Panama
Although there are antitrust statutes in all of these coun-
tries, each has very different objectives. Jamaica is included,
though not part of Latin America, as a country which is part of
the FTAA process. In Jamaica, the competition law is fairly
advanced, even if enforcement is negligible. It includes the
usual exceptions for research and development, and promotion
of technical or economic progress, provided that enterprises are
not afforded the possibility of eliminating competition in re-
spect of a substantial part of the goods or services concerned.
Mexican law is the most developed of the three, thanks to
NAFTA.5" Price fixing, output restriction, market division and
bid-rigging are held to be per se anticompetitive practices. The
Mexican law is also the law most like U.S. antitrust law and
51. Mexico's economic competition law, the Federal Act of Economic Competi-
tion, 34 I.L.M. 1045 (1992), was enacted in response to Ch. 15 of NAFTA.
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even encapsulates the Chicago School's vision of efficiency
within the statute itself.52
Panama adopts a system of absolute and relative monopo-
listic practices, which essentially portrays those practices that
in the U.S./Mexico model would be per se illegal as absolute
monopoly practices and those that a rule of reason would apply
to are classified as relative monopolistic practices. In Panama,
there are provisions to protect consumers, and unfair trade
practices, contained in Panama's anti-dumping legislation.
As regards economic concentrations, Jamaica analyzes
these on the basis of dominance and not monopoly. However,
simply being dominant does not constitute a breach. Abuse of
dominant position must be found. This looks more like Europe-
an competition law. In all cases there is an antitrust commis-
sion to investigate and bring actions in respect of
anticompetitive behavior.
Sanctions for anticompetitive conduct do not really act as
disincentives. Fines are limited, except in the case of Jamaica,
where fines of one million dollars may be imposed on corpora-
tions. It is still a far cry from the U.S./EU position where fines
of up to 10% of worldwide income can be imposed.
Enforcement in Mexico after NAFTA will be interesting to
monitor. The Mexican FCC is beginning to enforce competition
laws, and the constitutionality of the competition law has been
upheld.
C. Peru and Venezuela
In Peru and Venezuela, there are competition laws which
most closely resemble European competition laws. Venezuela,
as a member of the Andean Pact, must comply with the Ande-
an Pact's legislation on anything which restricts free trade in
the region. Exceptions exist in the agricultural sector in Vene-
zuela.
Venezuelan law closely tracks EU competition law, includ-
ing the abuse of dominant position doctrine, and specific excep-
tions for exclusive distribution and franchise agreements.
There is machinery for control of economic concentrations
52. See Joshua A. Newberg, Mexico's New Economic Competition Law: Toward
The Development of a Mexican Law of Antitrust, 31 COLUm. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 587,
593 (1994).
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only in the electricity sector in Peru. In Venezuela there is a
general prohibition, especially if concentrations arise from the
exercise of a single activity. Venezuelan law on concentrations
is quite developed, but enforcement is not very developed. In
Peru, there are a number of Commissions and tribunals
charged with the enforcement of antitrust, and this may give
rise to confusion. There are also sectoral bodies for competition
regulation, e.g., in the public telecommunications area. Private
actions are still rare in Peru and Venezuela.
In regard to sanctions, in Venezuela, major fines including
up to 10% gross sales are envisaged, while repeat offenders can
be fined up to 40% of gross sales.
Generally, competition laws have universal scope, except
that Costa Rica, Jamaica, Mexico, the United States and Vene-
zuela have established certain exceptions to the application of
certain laws for certain sectors and economic activities. Exam-
ples include agriculture, professional sports, labor organiza-
tions, and export activities. There is a control regime in place
in Peru for the electricity sector. Brazil, Canada, Colombia,
Jamaica, Mexico, and Venezuela additionally provide regula-
tions for the control or prior notification of economic concentra-
tion in order to assess the degree of concentration and its con-
sequences on competition. With the exception of Costa Rica, all
countries recognize the rights of affected parties to initiate
actions for damages or injuries before the ordinary courts.
However, it is unlikely that private actions will be used to
enforce the antitrust laws in anything remotely similar to the
way they are used in the United States.
XV. DEFINING THEMES IN LATIN AMERICAN ANTITRUST
LAWS
53
In all countries, price fixing is prohibited. In Colombia,
only horizontal agreements are prohibited. However, in certain
countries, a per se prohibition does not apply. For example, in
Jamaica horizontal price fixing is only prohibited if it has as
an effect the substantial lessening of competition. Similarly
bid-rigging is widely prohibited. There is some distinction
53. See OAS, Inventory of Domestic Laws and Regulations Relating to Compe-
tition Policy in the Western Hemisphere (1997) (analyzing the Argentine law in
English).
398 [Vol. XXIV:2
19981 COMPETITION POLICY IN THE AMERICAS
drawn in the case of output reduction-the majority of coun-
tries have a per se prohibition (e.g. Mexico and Panama), how-
ever Jamaica allows such activity if it is "in the public inter-
est." Market division is also prohibited by most countries, ex-
cept again in the case of Jamaica, where it is only prohibited if
its substantial effect is to lessen competition. Mexico follows
most closely the U.S. position in what I would call these "Cate-
gory A" offenses of price fixing, output restriction, bid-rigging
and market division. They are all per se illegal. This is an
effective demonstration of the effect of NAFTA. In Latin Amer-
ica, price fixing should be the first target for enforcement au-
thorities..
Tying agreements are prohibited in all of the countries on
a rule of reason-type analysis, or according to the doctrine of
relativity (Mexico, Costa Rica). In the Dominican Republic
(DR), it is prohibited only where the buyer is a consumer.
Refusals to deal fall afoul of most nations' competition laws.
However in Argentina, a mere commercial reason will make a
refusal to deal stand up to competitive analysis. A number of
countries make no provisions regarding refusals to deal, for
example Bolivia, Chile, the DR, and Mexico. Otherwise, a rule
of reason type of analysis is generally applied. For "Category
B" offenses, for example, predatory pricing, price discrimina-
tion and resale price maintenance, I see some discrepancies
between national approaches. In some cases, predatory pricing
can only be affected by a dominant party (Colombia), in other
cases, it is necessary to show an anticompetitive purpose (Pan-
ama). On the other hand, in Costa Rica, any act or agreement
resulting in production at less than normal value is deemed to
be a partial monopolistic practice, which is illegal, if the party
has market power. Price discrimination is generally prohibited,
except that in Brazil, as for all anticompetitive practices, you
must show anticompetitive effect, and apply a rule of reason
analysis. In Bolivia, you must show the intent to harm compe-
tition. In Colombia, you need to have a dominant position, in
order to come within the bounds of this practice. A form of per
se rule applies to concerted practices in this area. In Peru, if
some competitors are disadvantaged, then price discrimination
is completely prohibited. In Venezuela, there is a difference be-
tween horizontal and vertical practices-horizontal practices
are almost always per se illegal. Vertical agreements are pro-
hibited if conducted by an entity with dominant position.
399
BROOK. J. INTL L.
Since, in Latin America, state or private monopolies are a
very real problem, antitrust enforcement authorities should
also focus on taking action against single firms that obtain or
enhance monopoly power. Note also that in analyzing predato-
ry behavior, special attention will have to be paid to misuse of
government processes. In the area of predation there is a sub-
stantial difference between U.S. and European law, since the
Europeans apply an abuse of dominant position doctrine, in
which it is easier to find evidence than evidence required for a
U.S. attempt to monopolize charge. The European system is
more likely to protect competitors than it is to ensure market
competition. In Latin America in particular, there will be a
need to focus on genuinely exclusionary tactics.'
Resale Price Maintenance (RPM) is uniformly condemned.
However, in most countries, a quasi rule of reason is applied.
For example, in Mexico you must show that the purpose or
effect is to drive others out of the market. In Colombia, there is
no distinction drawn between horizontal and vertical price
fixing. They are both per se illegal. In no other country in
Latin America is RPM per se illegal. Either a rule of reason, or
the doctrine of relativity, which is common to both Mexico and
Costa Rica, applies. The doctrine of relativity states that before
a practice can be found to be anticompetitive, you must show
that there is market power, and that the practice relates to
goods or services in that particular market.
Having considered differences between EU and U.S. laws,
and surveyed emerging antitrust laws in Latin America, it is
worthwhile seeing how best some of the antitrust wisdom from
the EU and United States might be applied in the Latin Amer-
ican contact.
The remaining purely vertical restraints, I classify as
"Category C" restraints. These include, for example, territorial
restraints, exclusive distribution agreements and the like. In
certain countries, exclusive distribution agreements are prohib-
ited, but only to the extent they are intended or have an
anticompetitive effect. However only Mexico, Panama, Brazil,
Canada, Chile, and Costa Rica have laws which govern this.
54. See Fox, supra note 40, at 586.
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XVI. TRANSATLANTIC DIFFERENCES IN THE VERTICAL AREA
One major difference between U.S. and European law has
been illustrated in their approach to vertical arrangements.
This difference was highlighted in the Boeing/McDonnell-Doug-
las merger review, which led to completely different results
when analyzed by the European authorities and the U.S. au-
thorities, who were analyzing the same market (the worldwide
market for large commercial aircraft).
In the United States, vertical restraints are analyzed in
two categories, those that can lead to collusion, and those that
can lead to exclusion. However, U.S. antitrust recognizes that
vertical restraints may lead to real efficiencies by eliminating
the free-rider. Vertical restraints in the EU are analyzed dif-
ferently, bearing in mind the overriding goal of ensuring closer
economic integration within the European Union. The U.S.
authorities will generally be more lax than European authori-
ties about allowing territorial restrictions to stand.
In vertical merger cases, efficiency claims (as a defense in
a merger case) carry much more weight in the United States,
than currently in the European Union. I will now consider
specific exemptions of the difference in approach by EU and
U.S. officials in certain key vertical relationships.
A. Exclusive Dealing Agreements
Exclusive dealing arrangements are another area of differ-
ence between EU and U.S. systems. The key difference is at
what level of market foreclosure will the antitrust authority
find an exclusive dealing agreement invalid. European law is
generally more suspicious of exclusive dealing contracts, and a
lower level of foreclosure would be needed before the European
authorities found these invalid. This is clearly illustrated in
the different approaches to the exclusive supply agreements
between Boeing and various airlines which was analyzed in
the Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas merger.
The Europeans found that Boeing had a dominant position
in the market and abused that dominance by entering into
exclusive supply contracts with a number of airlines. The dom-
inance of the seller is the main factor. Dominant position in a
U.S. analysis would be only one of many factors in an overall
rule of reason analysis. The analysis is found in Tampa Elec-
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tric v. Nashville Coal.55 First, the court defined the product
and geographic markets and then sought to determine whether
the contract foreclosed competition in a substantial share of
that market. A contract would only be declared invalid if op-
portunities for other traders to enter into or remain in that
market were significantly limited. But any anticompetitive
effects such as the strength of the parties, the percentage of
commerce involved, and the present and future effects of fore-
closure on effective competition in the market are weighed
against any efficiency arising from the exclusive arrangement.
It may well be that there is a safe harbor for exclusive dealing
contracts which foreclose even up to 20%-30% of the market."
By contrast, under European law, it is only really the Delimitis
v. Henniger Brdu case57 that has adopted a foreclosure analy-
sis where the Court held that exclusive purchasing agreements
do not restrict competition unless they make a significant con-
tribution to the foreclosure of competitors from the market.
Nevertheless, pre-existing case law suggested that a European
court would simply condemn exclusive dealing arrangements, if
the seller had a dominant position." Cases after Delimitis
suggest that even when the exclusive contract amounted to
10% of the market, a violation could still be found. 9
In the Boeing case, the European Community and United
States analyzed Boeing's exclusive supply contracts differently.
How exclusive contracts are analyzed in Latin America will be
very important in assisting countries in the region with one of
their stated objectives, that of increasing foreign trade and
investments. In industry sectors where entry barriers are high,
exclusive contracts are an important tool to be able to compete.
It may be that applying a European-style approach would have
a chilling effect on such trade and investment flows.
55. Tampa Elec. v. Nashville Coal, 365 U.S. 320, 327-35 (1961).
56. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 17 (1984).
57. See Case C-234/89, Stergios Delimitis v. Henninger Brau AG, 1991 E.C.R.
935, 1-944-45.
58. See, e.g., Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 461.
59. See Commission Decision Relating to a Proceeding Pursuant to Article 85
of the EEC Treaty against Langese-Iglo GmbH, No. IV/34.072, 1993 O.J. (L 183)
19, 22.
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B. Vertical Mergers"
The treatment of vertical mergers will also be very impor-
tant in any developing economy where foreign investment is
encouraged. There is likely to be significant integration be-
tween manufacturers seeking to integrate their distribution
networks, or between two manufacturers where there is likely
to be technology transfer.
The United States has analyzed vertical integration by
looking closely at the impact of any resulting foreclosure on
competition. The 1984 Merger Guidelines1 describe several
theories of possible competitive harm from a vertical merger.
One is the effect on potential competitors-if the industry has
a high degree of vertical integration, and a limited indepen-
dent supply of product in the upstream market, a downstream
competitor might feel compelled to enter the upstream market
as well. A vertical merger might also facilitate collusion by
knowledge of downstream prices by upstream rivals and vice
versa.
In Europe, market integration is the overriding goal. This
strongly impacts the analysis of vertical arrangements.62 In
Europe, merger control is governed by the 1989 regulation
4064/89 - the Merger Regulation. Here the Euiropean Union is
particularly concerned by firms that integrate manufacture
and distribution, and can exert power over their suppliers.
The approach to collusion differs as between the United
States and European Union in merger analysis. Historically,
the United States used the Herfindahl Hirschmann Index
(H=I) as an indication of coordinated effects, whereas the
European Union considered only dominance. Currently a uni-
lateral effects analysis is beginning to be employed in the Unit-
ed States. The European starting point is to look at the market
60. See Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, U.S. Federal Trade European Commission,
Vertical Restraints and Vertical Aspects of Mergers-A U.S. Perspective, Address
at the Fordham Corporate Law Institute 24th Annual Conference on International
Antitrust Law and Policy (Oct. 16-17, 1997).
61. See Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, 1984 Merger Guidelines, 49
Fed. Reg. 26, 823 (1984), reprinted in 2 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) No. 655, 4490-
4495 (1994).
62. See Juan Briones Alonso, Head of the Merger Task Force, European Com-
mission, Vertical Aspects of Mergers, Joint Ventures, and Strategic Alliances, Ad-
dress at the Fordham Corporate Law Institute 24th Annual Conference on Interna-
tional Antitrust Law and Policy (Oct. 16-17, 1997).
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share controlled by leading suppliers. What is true is that the
European Commission is unlikely to authorize a merger which
results in or reinforces a position on the basis of efficiencies.
In the United States, merger analysis is moving towards a
more dynamic analysis of the markets. Mergers that benefit
from efficiencies are beginning to be recognized, particularly in
the vertical area. In the case of distribution efficiencies, the
presence of another brand properly distributed in the market
might well lead to a more efficient market, with the potential
for an increase in interbrand competition and lower prices to
consumers. A static merger model, based only on existing mar-
ket shares, results in a snapshot of competition in a particular
industry.63 Importantly, international competitiveness and the
drive towards technological superiority are being expressly
recognized in merger analysis, and innovation benefits arising
from such analysis for technology transfer is so important to
economies in transition that such concepts should be encour-
aged and utilized by those countries' antitrust agencies. In-
creases in efficiency likewise should be considered.
Currently, analysis focuses at least in part, on the possibil-
ity that the merged firm would alter its behavior unilaterally
following the acquisition by elevating price and suppressing
output. Specifically applying to vertical integration, the FTC
and Department of Justice (DOJ) recognize foreclosure as a
potential competitive harm of vertical mergers, either input
foreclosure (denying access of essential inputs to downstream
rivals) and downstream foreclosure (denying downstream out-
lets for production, thus raising upstream rivals' costs).
What should the approach be for Latin America? In many
(if not all of the countries of the region) the presence of monop-
olies is significant. Since these monopolies are often inefficient,
antitrust law must do something about them. In addition, the
law must facilitate inflows of foreign trade and investment
that often take the form, in emerging markets, of vertical inte-
gration. In order to balance these different goals, we need a
flexible approach to vertical integration that allows efficiencies
to have a greater role in analyzing whether mergers should or
should not be authorized. Particularly in vertical integration,
63. Thomas N. Dahdouh & James F. Mongoven, The Shape of Things to
Come: Innovation Market Analysis in Merger Cases, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 405, 406
(1996).
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weight should be given to efficiencies in distribution as this
will increase interbrand competition and lead to lower prices
for consumers.
A specific merger regulation is advised in Latin America
(bearing in mind the civil law tradition of the countries to
which I refer) that could encapsulate (in such a way as not to
become inflexible) some of the concepts referred to above. Note
that an overly hasty attempt to break up the monopolies (by
applying European dominance concepts) might lead to some
short-term damage to the national economies of the countries
involved. It is interesting that at this time, there is a trend in
the United States to examine vertical mergers more closely (in
line with European law).
C. Strategic Alliances
Strategic alliances and joint ventures are areas where
antitrust treatment will be very important. These tools are
particularly important for multi-nationals, and others access-
ing new markets. They are also critical to ensuring the trans-
fer of technology to developing countries.
It is the foreclosure effects of such joint ventures which
have led to a number of decisions, notably by CADE," which
might have a negative chilling effect on foreign investors. An
analysis of EU and U.S. laws in this area might prove instruc-
tive. In addition, many joint ventures should be encouraged by
the countries in the region, because (as stated above) of the
possibility of technology transfer.
The European approach focuses on potential foreclosure
effects to other competitors (see for example, Atlas5 and
Phoenix/Global,66 where conditions were imposed to guard
against the dangers of vertical foreclosure). Of course vertical
integration effects as a result of merger or joint ven-
ture/strategic alliance vary greatly depending on the sector.67
64. See the Miller/Brahma [Ato de Concentrago No. 58/95] and Anheuser-
Busch/Antarctica decisions [Ato de Concentragdo No. 83/96].
65. Commission Decision Relating to a Proceeding Under Article 85 of the EC
Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement - Atlas, No. IV/35.337, 1996 O.J. (L
239) 23.
66. Commission Decision Relating to a Proceeding Under Article 85 of the EC
Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement - Phoenix/Global One/Case No.
IV/35.617, 1996 O.J. (L 239) 57.
67. See generally Michael J. Reynolds, Mergers and Joint Ventures: The Verti-
405
BROOK. J. INTL L.
In the UK, by way of example, greater emphasis has been
placed on vertical integration in the drinks sector. 8 The U.S.
approach to the potential competitor theory of which CADE
appears to have grown fond is instructive.
Another important aspect to vertical integration is the
possibility that companies "might camouflage inefficient perfor-
mance in one aspect of their business."69 In many of the in-
dustries in the emerging economies of Latin America, there is
a great need to make businesses more efficient, and also en-
sure that inefficiencies cannot be hidden.
If the goal is market integration, it is clear that a greater
emphasis will be placed on vertical relationships. In the con-
text of competition rules in CARICOM or MERCOSUR (dis-
cussed later), a greater emphasis or analysis of vertical rela-
tionships is to be expected, as opposed to national rules, since
market integration will be a goal. However, there is some re-
cent evidence suggesting that vertical restraints do not affect
the goal of market integration as greatly as was once thought.
It may even be that the benefit of better ensuring inter-brand
competition as a result of allowing vertical restraints out-
weighs any negative effect on the market integration goal."
D. Mergers-Analysis of Efficiencies
Merger analysis, I argue, should take into account a range
of efficiencies as possibly pro-competitive. This way we can also
assess the effect of changing market conditions, particularly
appropriate for a free trade area, such as the FTAA, which
encompasses emerging economies. Merger analysis should take
into account relevant geographic markets, including foreign
supply responses, with regard to actual barriers to entry. We
must also consider the effect of the merger on competition in
innovation. This will be particularly significant in the telecom-
munications and high-tech sectors, such as biotechnology and
cal Dimension, Address at the Fordham Corporate Law Institute 24th Annual
Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy (Oct. 16-17, 1997).
68. Id.
69. This was specifically recognized in the Carlsberg-Tetley decision in the
U.K. 1997 Cmnd. 3662, at § 2.87.
70. See Mario Siragusa, Rethinking Article 85: Problems and Challenges in
the Design and Enforcement of the EC Competition Rules, Address at the
Fordham Corporate Law Institute 24th Annual Conference on International Anti-
trust Law and Policy (Oct. 16-17, 1997).
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semi-conductors. We must encourage innovation and ensure
that the prize of being first is continuous improvement and
innovation. Especially in these sectors there is an advantage in
combining complimentary technologies leading to a growth in
joint ventures and an increased role in the use of licensing.
Joint venture activity is particularly critical in accessing
emerging markets, such as those in Latin America. Pro-com-
petitive efficiencies are taken into account when a rule of rea-
son analysis is applied to conduct in violation of the Sherman
Act. Although U.S. Supreme Court authority on mergers has
not evolved in the way that its analysis of Sections 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Act has, guidelines such as the Horizontal Merg-
er Guidelines (1984) have been applied. The 1992 Merger
Guidelines state that "the primary benefit of mergers to the
economy is their efficiency-enhancing potential," and implied
that in the majority of cases firms could achieve available
efficiencies without department interference. The question that
must be resolved is whether the efficiencies must themselves
relate specifically to this transaction (otherwise it would be
arguable that the increased efficiency was not the reason for
the merger).
Efficiencies probably pose no greater burden than other
types of evidentiary issues. However, there is some evidence
suggesting that it is difficult for businesses to measure likely
efficiencies accrued pre-merger, and project post-merger, be-
cause of the difficulty of producing price and cost information.
One matter that is particularly relevant is the analysis of
distressed industries' claims in merger analysis. Failing com-
panies in the United States looking to merge have long arguhed
that they should be exempt from Section 7 of the Clayton Act
which prohibits mergers and acquisitions that may substan-
tially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly. Under
the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guideline,"1 the failing firm de-
fense will be accepted where:
(a) Allegedly failing firm would be unable to meet its
financial obligations in the near future;
71. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division & Federal Trade Commission,
Horizontal Merger Guidelines (1992), 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552001 (1992), reprinted in 4
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13, 104 (1992).
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(b) It would not be able to reorganize successfully under
Ch. 11 of the Bankruptcy Act;
(c) It has made unsuccessful good-faith efforts to elicit
reasonable alternative offers of acquisition of the assets
of the failing firm that would key its tangible and intan-
gible assets in the relevant market, and pose a lesser
danger to competition than does the proposed merger;
and
(d) Absent the acquisition, the assets of the failing firm
would exit the relevant market.
It is widely belived that it is unwise to carve out specific
exemptions for distressed industries, and that a competitive
effects analysis is the correct approach.
The DOJ is beginning now to turn to a unilateral effects
analysis, rather than the old HHI, in its merger analysis. Pow-
er and the exact definition of the market is becoming arguably
less important. But what is becoming more significant is the
precise projected effect on price of the merger. But obtaining
this type of price information is very difficult and probably
unsuitable for countries currently struggling to set up adminis-
trative bodies to deal with antitrust problems. Certainly, a
coordinated effects analysis would be easier to apply. The uni-
lateral effects analysis is particularly relevant for those "gate-
keeper" industries, like utilities, where behavior can have a
significant effect on price. In Latin America, this could become
very significant, as foreign investors seek to invest in key util-
ities in the electricity and telecommunications sectors, as a
result of the wave of privatizations.
The approach to mergers in the countries differs markedly.
The spectrum ranges from one extreme in the case of Brazil
where any dominance is illegal, to those countries which en-
courage efficiency producing mergers (Colombia, Jamaica). All
prohibit mergers where the merger would restrict free competi-
tion. However Bolivia is somewhat regressive in that its prohi-
bition applies where the economic independence of the state is
threatened.
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XVII. SANCTIONS
The approach of the different countries to sanctions for
anticompetitive activity also differs widely. Measurement is
very different - in the case of Colombia, Costa Rica, and Mexi-
co, reference is made to the minimum wage. Others decide by
reference to company profits, for example, Venezuela (10-20%
sales), or stated fine (Peru - fine capped to 10% of income or
Argentina, fine of up to 20% of profit unlawfully obtained). Not
every country carries penal provisions for breaches of the law
(no penal sanctions at all in Brazil).
Two points need to be made to conclude this analysis.
First, most of the Latin American laws do not coherently break
the subject down into categories of offenses as I have. Second,
there is still some divergence between the ways the different
countries seek to promote free competition. In many cases,
special sectoral exceptions are established and this may make
a coherent application of competition policy more difficult. In
most countries, the antitrust laws are constituted by a some-
what ad hoc mixture of the Constitution, the criminal law and
civil sanctions. Rarely, except in the case of Mexico, is there
any coherent underpinning, or philosophical framework in
which the law is set.
XVIII. SUBSIDIES, ANTI-DUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING
DUTIES 2
This area is worthy of mention, since these topics fall
within the general competition area found within European
antitrust concepts and the jealously-guarded U.S. dumping
law. It is illegal for member states of the European Union to
levy dumping duties against other member states. However,
Community authorities may order protective relief against
dumped imports from countries outside the Union." Under
EU law, a product is deemed to be dumped if its export price
into the Community is less than its normal value.' If no nor-
mal price can be readily determined, the European Union will
72. OAS Trade Unit Report to the FTAA Working Group on Subsidies, Anti-
Dumping and Countervailing Duties (1997).
73. Council Regulation 2177/84/ECSC of July 27, 1984, 1984 O.J. (L 201) 1.
74. Commission Decision 2177/84/ECSC of July 27, 1984, 1984 O.J. (L 201) 17,
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look at a constructed price based on the cost of production,
plus a reasonable margin of profit. If this is established and an
economic injury to the Community is shown, then a definitive
anti-dumping duty will be imposed. Rather than imposing
duties, the European Commission has the right to take under-
takings after an investigation.75 However, the EEC, as it then
was, became concerned that foreign producers could circum-
vent the anti-dumping rules by importing some product into
the European Union cheaply, and finishing it off in the Euro-
pean Union, so as to avoid the imposition of anti-dumping
duties. The European Commission therefore imposed certain
rules on these types of operations:
(a) The assembly and production must be carried out by
a related or associated party;
(b) The assembly or production must have been started
or substantially increased after the opening of an anti-
dumping investigation. The problem with this is that the
decision to augment production requires lead time, and
may be instigated prior to an anti-dumping investiga-
tion; and
(c) The value of the parts or materials used and originat-
ing in the country of exportation of the product subject
to the anti-dumping duty must exceed the value of all
other parts or materials used by at least 50%. The condi-
tion requiring at least 60% origination in a certain coun-
try is effectively a Rule of Origin. Only if this content is
made out can an anti-dumping duty be levied.
There is clearly a problem in which type of legitimate
operations will be reached by this type of anti-Circumvention
law.
The United States has a well-developed body of law in
area, as well as the general unfair trade practices area. The
first area that should be considered is the operation of Section
337 of the Tariff Act of 1930."6 Section 337 has been used to
75. Gerwin van Gerven, New Anti-Circumvention Rules In EEC Anti-Dumping
Law, 22 INT'L LAW. 809, 815 (1988).
76. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1988).
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protect U.S. holders of intellectual property rights against
foreign infringements. Trading partners of the United States
complain that Section 337 is unnecessary under the GATT.
Section 337 violates GATT law because foreigners have inferior
rights to U.S. individuals under it and therefore violates
GATT's requirements for national treatment. Article XX(d)
provides an exception from the national treatment provisions,
if they are necessary to comply with national laws or regula-
tions concerning the protection of intellectual property or to
prevent deceptive practices. This has been upheld for Section
337 in GATT panel on Spring Assemblies, 77 for example, the
exclusion order issued in that case by the United States was
held to be the only way of dealing with the problem of foreign
infringers.
XIX. DEFINING PRINCIPLES TO BE INCLUDED IN A REGIONAL
POLICY
The analysis of competition policy highlighted above, illus-
trates that there is a need to develop a more coherent ap-
proach to competition policy, to underpin the individual anti-
trust laws, and how they are enforced by the countries in the
Latin American and Caribbean region. There is scope for an
overreaching hemispheric antitrust policy (with or without
institutional support), which breaks down those behaviors
which are anticompetitive as we have attempted to do, and
applies a different approach to each one. Qnly then will the
overall policy work efficiently, without creating problems, and
will make sense to foreign businesses that are doing business
in the region. In addition, it will be important in countries
where competition policy is rarely enforced, that some scope is
given to the enforcement of competition law through private
rights of action. This would be a very powerful tool to secure
the implementation of competition policy into standard busi-
ness practices. Also, a clear decision needs to be taken whether
a purely allocative efficiency model should be adopted, which
would only really prohibit certain horizontal behavior, or
whether an approach closer to a more liberal school should be
adopted, which would be more critical of vertical restraints. We
77. United States-Imports of Certain Automotive Spring Assemblies, May 26,
1983, GATT B.I.S.D. (30th Supp.) at 107, 126 (1984).
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need to also consider whether it is even important to draw a
distinction between horizontal and vertical conduct. The bene-
fits of a per se, and rule of reason approach need to be consid-
ered. Abusive practices must be curtailed certainly, but the
real problem lies with dominant entities abusing their posi-
tions, not with those emerging businesses seeking to grow.
As a starting point, the Max Plank Institute's Antitrust
Code contains useful guidance in this area, as does Eleanor
Fox's article setting out the need for substantive principles
which nations could agree and which could then be delegated
down to member states for inclusion in their own national
laws.7"
The following principles are proposed:
(a) An anti-cartel rule, including provisions to prevent
denial of market access by artificial means;
(b) A definite power vested in a region-wide institution
to issue directives so that member states have to incor-
porate consensus principles in their national laws;
(c) A definite agreement by member states that the guid-
ing principle of the region's law is to encourage the net
increase in total social welfare in the region, and not in
each individual member state;
(d) Provisions, which should mirror those of the Europe-
an Union on the freedom of movement of personnel,
capital and goods within the region. This should also
include the freedom of establishment, particularly in the
services sector;
(e) An agreement, which no doubt will involve substan-
tial Latin and European pressure on the United States
that anti-dumping rules be brought more closely into
line with price predation rules, so that low-price compe-
tition is actually encouraged;
(W There must be provisions which enable a member
78. See Blitz & Wighton, supra note 25.
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state whose internal domestic market is harmed by
anticompetitive conduct outside its borders to seek to
enforce the national law of the injuring member state,
whether the injury arises from private or from a public
(e.g government sponsored wrong). The only way to
ensure that such a right is effective is by having a re-
gion-wide institution to assist in enforcing it. Useful
examples include the NAFTA binational review panel
which oversees complaints about anti-dumping and
countervailing duty matters, and in effect decides
whether a particular member state is actually in contra-
vention of its own laws. Another example would be the
EU competition directorate. As a final measure the com-
plaining nation should be able to bring a cause of action
in its own national courts. There is no way that the
United States and Europeans will cede this to each oth-
er, let alone anywhere else, so there would have to be a
strong, not just an extant, hemispheric institution over-
seeing this process. In order to build a case, a substan-
tial amount of information of a legal and economic na-
ture needs to be marshalled and a hemispheric-wide
institution is the ideal support to the national processes;
(g) There is a role for a coordinating body for the region
which could release guidelines and policy statements to
provide a discipline on the different countries in the
region to implement into their own laws, in much the
same way as the European Commission. This could sig-
nificantly assist the overall drive towards harmoniza-
tion;
(h) Cooperation between member state antitrust authori-
ties will be very important. The best way of enforcing
cooperation is by using the hemispheric body to enforce
cooperation and to be the vehicle through which the
more developed countries can provide technical assis-
tance to the less developed countries;
(i) State aids must be dealt with particularly in Latin
American markets. The EU internal market model,
whereby state aids must be reported and justified, is a
good model for the hemispheric region;
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(j) There should be agreed-upon rules regarding non-
discrimination in government procurement rules; and
(k) Although, not entirely within the realm of the compe-
tition laws, national treatment of foreign investments is
important to removal of distortions in the market.
XX. REGIONAL INITIATIVES79
A. Introduction
It is worth considering, at this point, what steps are being
taken at a regional level. In MERCOSUR, a December 1996
Protocol"0 was signed by member countries, which gives
guidelines towards a common competition policy. No suprana-
tional bodies are envisaged, only a mechanism to guide nation-
al enforcement. The Protocol must be approved by national
Congresses before it becomes law. The list of anticompetitive
practices covers price-fixing to price discrimination and exclu-
sive dealing, without any real discussion of the relevant analy-
sis. The rule of reason analysis is applied to all anticompetitive
practices. Rather like the European Union, if a case has a
"Mercosur Dimension" the Committee for the Defense of Com-
petition will have jurisdiction over it. The Protocol also pro-
vides for the harmonization of domestic competition laws. How-
ever, one has to be very careful when one applies blanket anal-
ysis to price discrimination. When there are many inefficient
industries, there is a greater risk that applying rigid price
discrimination rules will penalize efficiency.
Despite some positive signs coming from the Protocol-for
example, it looks like it will contain a workable method for
dealing with export cartels-the problem with the Protocol is
that it does nothing about enforcement policies, and the heart
of antitrust is in the enforcement policies and the application
of what are essentially (and intentionally) ambiguous laws.
Agreeing to harmonize and draft joint standards is not helpful
79. See Jos6 Tavares de Araujo, Jr. & Luis Tineo, The Harmonization of Com-
petition Policies Among Mercosur Countries, 24 BROOK. J. INTL L. 443 (1998).
80. Protocolo de Defesa da Concorr~ncia no Mercosul, Decision 18/96, Dec. 17,
1996, reprinted in 19 BOLETIM DE INTEGRAgAO LATINO-A ERIcANA 73 (1996).
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unless something is done about the substance of the decision-
making process itself. Nevertheless, indications in the Protocol
that a properly staffed agency will publish industry reports
and regular policy statements are to be lauded.
B. Andean Pact Developments
Colombia, Peru and Venezuela are the countries which
have antitrust statutes intended to be modeled after Articles
85 and 86 of the Treaty Establishing the European Communi-
ty. In the Andean Pact, there is no regional competition policy.
The erratic nature of the decisions demonstrate that there is
still a continued need for hemispheric direction, drawing on
the experience of other countries. The real problem in the
Andean countries is the lack of real independence of the au-
thorities.
XXI. CONCLUSION
The key question as to how countries in Latin America
will enforce their competition laws is not so much what the
letter of the law is, but what are the policies which inform
enforcement of those laws. The way to proceed must be to draw
upon the concepts of European and U.S. law, without simply
adopting wholesale one or the other (with all that entails),
while always bearing in mind the economic objectives of the
nations that are striving to develop free and efficient markets
after decades of inefficiency and state interference. A regional
body that could issue policy directives and draw on greater
resources than those available to individual regulatory authori-
ties is worthy of further investigation. Properly carried out,
such a body could be critical to greater harmonization of anti-
trust enforcement in the region, providing greater certainty
and predictability to businesses. It could also help ensure that
the economic reforms necessary to develop free markets are not
turned back while simultaneously checking the rising tide of
protectionism in countries which have to manage the effects of
globalization, even if this is not to their short-term advantage.
In Brazil in particular, we have seen the dangers of apply-
ing concepts drawn from other jurisdictions. Multinationals
seeking to invest in Brazil, or global mergers with Brazilian
dimensions, must now consider how best to steer their transac-
tions through an increasingly active competition authority. As
415
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that authority draws on the jurisprudence of the inore devel-
oped competition systems in the United States and Europe, an
understanding of how to use U.S. and European concepts will
become increasingly important for those companies to realize
their goals. For the CADE itself, its reliance on U.S. and Euro-
pean wisdom is to be lauded, and critics should not be too
harsh about the results. Nevertheless, there is a danger in
applying these concepts without a deep understanding of how
they came into being, their context, and how they have stood
the test of time. It is hoped that as Brazil becomes a full mem-
ber of the global economy, this knowledge will shape CADE
decision making, and that CADE will focus some energy on
issuing statements that give businesses a better idea of how
the decision-making process works to assist in creating a more
stable and predictable business environment.
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